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In The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THERAL V. BISHOP and 
ROSS L. COVINGTON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 10054 
Brief of Petitioner 
NATURE OF CASE 
Action by petitioner commenced in this Court for an 
Extraordinary Writ in the nature of quo warranto against 
respondents asserting and alleging that respondents as 
Mayor and Commissioner respectively have no right to 
hold said respective offices, but are usurpers. 
ORIGINAL PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT TO SUPREME COURT 
This is an orginal action to this Court and has never 
been passed upon or tried in a lower court. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner seeks the ouster of said respondents from 
their respective offices of Mayor and Commissioner of 
Logan City, Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 7th day of November, '1961, at Logan City, 
Utah an election was duly held for the office of Mayor 
and one City Commissioner for a term of four years from 
January 2, 1962; that at said election, Respondent Theral 
V. Bishop was elected Mayor of Logan City and Respond-
ent Ross L. Covington was elected Commissioner of Logan 
City; that on the 2nd day of January, 1962, the said duly 
elected officers duly qualified by taking their oaths of of-
fice and have since said time continued to act as officers 
in those respective capacities as ~1ayor and Commissioner 
of said City; that Logan City by virtue of the laws of Utah 
is a second class city. 
Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 18 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, reads as follows: "Election expenses to be publish-
ed - Penalty - Every elective officer in a city of the first and 
second class shall within thirty days after qualifying file 
with the city recorder and publish at least once in a daily 
newspaper of general circulation in the city a sworn state-
ment of all his election expenses, showing by whom such 
funds were contributed. In case any such elective officer 
fails to publish such statement his office becomes vacant, 
and such officer in addition thereto shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor." 
It is admitted that the said respondents did not pub-
lish within the required 30 days after duly qualifying, but 
did make an attempt about 154 days after their qualifica-
tion- on June 7, 1962, to comply with said statute, a copy 
of which is set out in Amendment to Petition for Extra-
ordinary Writ; that there was no other filing or publishing 
than that of June 7, 1962. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
That petitioner, prior to the commencement of action 
in this Court, had notified the Attorney General of this 
State of the failure of respondents to comply with the here 
quoted statute, but said Attorney General on the 3rd day 
of April, 1963, gave his answer and refused to act as will 
he observed from exhibits A, B, C, D, and E, which exhib-
its were made part of the Petition for an Extraordinary 
Writ and which shows permission was given by Attorney 
General to petitioner to file this suit. That said petition 
was placed before this Court on the 9th day of January, 
1964, and since said time has been filed with the Clerk of 
this Court as well as a cost and damage bond. That there-
after the respondents made a Motion to Dismiss and Ans-
wered the Petition. To this Motion, petitioner filed are-
ply opposing said motion and replying to said answer. 
On the 18th day of February, 1964, a hearing was 
held on this matter and after duly considering this matter, 
this Court granted an Alternative Writ and ordered peti-
tioner and respondents to file printed briefs. 
ARGUMENT 
1 
THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AS AMENDED ARE 
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PETITIONER HAS SUFFIC-
IENT INTEREST AND THAT HE MAY BRING AC-
TION IN HIS OWN NAME BY VIRTUE OF 65B (d) 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
\Vhile the overall question is whether petitioner has 
stated a good cause of action for the relief sought, it seems 
to us that it might for the sake of clear discussion to divide 
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that question up and treat it under separate headings and 
we have so done. So we proceed now under number 1. 
It will be noted that the petition as Amended alleges 
that petitioner is a citizen, a resident, a qualified voter, 
a property owner and taxpayer in Logan City, Utah. 
In the case of Norton v. People ( 1938) 102 Colo. 48'9 
81 P. ( 2) 393, in a quo warranto proceedings where 
pertinent statutes were silent, as in our statute, as to the 
qualifications of a relator, it was held that in a proceeding 
testing the sufficiency of the incorporation of a town and 
as a result the validity of the holding of certain muicipal 
offices by the respondents, the relator's interest was suf-
ficient, against a claim that he was neither a resident nor 
a taxpayer of the muicipality in question, where the facts 
showed that he had leased and operated a filling station 
for a number of years, and subsequently purchased the 
same, though title to the land was taken in the name of his 
wife rather than himself, and the fact that his residence 
was not in the muncipality was immaterial. The court 
remarked that a slight interest was sufficient to permit 
an individual to qualify as relator in a quo warranto action. 
The statute authorizing without limitation on its face 
the bringing of a quo warranto action in the name of the 
state by a private person on his own complaint when the 
attorney general refused to act, in order to oust an alleged 
usurper of public office was held in State ex rei. Martin 
v. Ekern ( 1938) 228 Wis 645, 280 NW 393, to have valida-
ted the bringing of such action by a private relator against 
the alleged usurper of the office of lieutenant governor of 
the state, where it was shown that the attorney general had 
been requested by the relator to bring the action, but had 
declined to do so. And in the case of State ex rei. Williams 
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v Samuelson ( 1907) 131 Wis 499, 111 N\V 712, a private 
pt·rson was held to have the right to bring his own com-
plaint in quo warranto proceedings where he was shown 
to be a taxpayer. To the same effect is State ex rei. Water-
bury v ~lartin ( 1878) 46 Conn 479 and the case of Huff 
v .Amkrson ( 1955) 212 Ga 32, 90 SE 2d. 329, and also the 
casl' of Whitehurst v. Jones (1903) 117 Ga 803,45 SE 49. 
:\nd it will be further noted in the case of State ex rei. 
Pooser v Wister 170 So. 736, "that it is enough that he is 
a citizen and having the law upheld, but this, like all other 
rules of law, has its limitations." 
Petitioner submits that he may bring this action in his 
own name under 65 B (d) of the Rules of Civil Proceedure 
which reads as follows: 
"Action hy Private Person Under Subdivision (1) of this 
Rule." "A person claiming to be entitled to a public or 
private office unlawfully held and exercised by another 
may bring an action therefor. A private person may 
bring ~m action upon any other ground set forth in sub-
division (b) 1 of this rule) only if the Attorney General 
fails to do so after notice. Any such action commenced 
by a private person shall be brought in his own name." 
We believe that the cases here cited and 65 B (d) of 
the Rules of Civil Proceedure here quoted are suficient 
to show that petitioner has sufficient interest and that he 
is a proper party in bringing this action. And that the 
cases cited and 65 B (d) here cited are a complete reply to 
respondents Motion to Dismiss on this phase of the case. 
And we believe that when the Attorney General refused to 
proceed, petitioner had the same authority to proceed and 
with the same effect as if the Attorney General had taken 
over upon request. 
In some of these cases a private relator did not even 
han' to bring action in his own name, but could and did 
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bring it in the name of the state. Our statute, in this re-
gard, says that a private individual shall bring it in his 
own name. And it is most interesting to note under Sub-
division (b) 1 of this rule, there is a comment by the com-
piler of the 1953 Utah Code Annotated. Vol. 9 page 733 
and at top thereof which reads as follows: "Under the 
above subdivision a private person may commence the ac-
tion where the attorney-general fails so to do after notice." 
II 
PETITIONER HAS NO ADEQUATE AND SPEEDY 
REMEDY IN THE COURSE OF THE LAW AND 
THEREFORE HE NEED NOT INITIALLY APPLY TO 
A LOWER COURT FOR RELIEF, BUT MAY ORIGIN-
ALLY BRING ACTION TO THE SUPRE~1E COURT. 
We believe a sufficient affirmation of this phase of 
the case lies in paragraph 7 of petition for an extraordinary 
writ which alleges that the said question herein involved 
is one that should be determined in the first instance by 
this Court in the interest of speedy justice, inasmuch as 
respondents are unlawfully usurping, holding, exercising, 
and intruding themselves into public offices of the state. 
The necessary delay in first applying to the lower court 
and a review of its decision by appeal would be such as to 
render the remedy essentially useless. 
III 
SECTION 18 OF TITLE 10 CHAPTER 6 OF 1953 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS MANDATORY AND 
NOT MERELY DIRECTORY AND THAT RESPOND-
ENTS FAILED TO COMPLY THEREWITH, AND 
THEIR OFFICES BECAME VACANT. 
Petitioner submits that this statute is mandatory and 
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not merely directory for the said section recites that fail-
ure to file and publish such a statement within 30 days af-
ter the taking oath, his office becomes vacant, and such 
officer in addition thereto shall be guilty of a misdomean-
(.'f. 
In Southerlands Statutory Construction 3 Edition, 
Chapter 58, Vol. 3, page 76, it is observed: "Where the 
langt•age of the statute is clear and unambiguous the 
Courts may hold that the construction is obvious from the 
lanunage used." 
0' ~ 5' 
In Tuthell v. Aendleiman ~ N.E. (2) 375, the court 
said that the general rule in determining whether a stat-
ute is mandatory or directory or advisory was as follows: 
where the terms of the statute are preemtory and exclusive, 
where no discretion is reposed or where penalties are pro-
vided for its violation, the provisions of the act must be re-
garded as mandatory. To the same effect is Hudgins v. 
~lorresville Consolidated School District 278 S.W. 769 
( 1925) and it was held in the case of Annehick v. Trans-
american Freight Lines, D.C. Mich. 46 F. Supp. 861, 866, 
that an employer's violation respecting minimum compen-
sation for overtime work by an employee was "mandatory" 
and neither ignorance of the employer nor his good inten-
tions were a defense against the penalty. 
In our own state in the case of State v. Christensen. 
8-! Ut. 185, 35 P ( 2) 775, this Court held that when Mr. 
Stein failed to qualify within 60 days as the statute re-
quired the office became vacant. That the statute was 
mandatory and self-executing. And in the case Oda v. 
Elk Grove Union Grammar School District 143 P (2) 
490,492, the Court held that where performance of a stat-
utory requirements is mandatory, there can be no "substan-
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tial compliance" with the statute, except in accordance 
with the particular provisions. 
It is stated in Am. Jur. Vol. 11, Sec 74 pp. 699 that 
"one of the recognized rules in a constitutional provision 
is not self-executing when it merely lays down general 
principles, but that it is self-executing if it supplies a suf-
ficient rule by means of which the right which it grants 
may be enjoyed and protected, or a duty which it imposes 
may be enforced without a legislative enactment." 
Respondents did not make an attempt to comply with 
the statute here involved until June 7,1962, approximately 
154 days after they took their oaths of office. And as 
pointed out in petitioners type written brief heretofore 
subitted, respondents even then did not comply substant-
ially with the requirements of the said statute not only in 
point of time, but in point of substance or matters that are 
required under said 10-6-18. Therefore there was no sub-
stantial compliance as claimed by respondents through 
their counsel, Mr. George D. Preston, either in point of 
time or substance. 
IV. 
THAT SAID SECTION 18 OF TITLE 10 CHAPTER 
6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 HAS NEVER BEEN 
REPEALED. 
Perhaps respondents will again claim that this law has 
been repealed by Chapter 14, Sections 1 to 47 inclusive 
and particularly Sections 20-14-9 to 20-14-14. 
There is no incompatibility in those Acts and 10-6-18 
even by implication. We believe that the repeal of a law 
is never indulged in unless it is clearly shown that there is 
such an incompatibility that one must necessarily fall. And 
10 
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it must be further remembered that 10-6-18 has nothing 
whatever to do with before elections. It only comes into 
play after officers have fully qualified as Mr. Bishop and 
\lr. Covington evidently did, and only then. The Cor-
rupt Practice Act so far as filing election expenses is con-
cerned, applies only before the elected parties take oath, 
wlwrease 10-6-18 not only says they must file after quali-
fying. but in addition thereto must publish in a newspaper 
of general circulation within the city within 30 days after 
qualifications and failing to publish, a vacancy exists. 
There is nothing in the Corrupt Practice Act which says 
anything about publication. 
On this phase of the 1~~ petitiner can do no better 
than cite 50 Am. Jur. pp. ~'Sec.~ and following sec-
tion. In these sections it is said that repeal by implica-
tion is not favored and that if two constructions are pos-
sible the one will be adopted to support the earlier act, 
rather than to repeal it by implication. 
CONCLUSION 
That the public has a vital interest in this matter is be-
yond dispute. 
There was submitted to this Court typewritten briefs 
before the hearing on the 18th day of February, 1964, by 
petitioner. We would, if possible, incorporate these 
briefs as part of this printed brief for the Court's consider-
ation. 
It is respectfully submitted that the undisputed facts 
and the law applicable to those facts compel the ouster of 
respondents, as Mayor and Commissioner of Logan City. 
'Ye therefore respectfully submit and request that a 
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I 
Judgment and Writ should issue out of this Court ousting,~ 
said respondents from their respective offices as Mayor .~ 
and Commissioner of Logan City, Utah. 1 
Dated this 17th day of March, 1964. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harvey A. Sjostrom 
375 West Center Street, 
Logan, Utah 
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